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Using domain knowledge to select solutions
in abductive diagnosis
Frank van Harmelen
 
and Annette ten Teije  
Abstract. This paper presents a novel extension to abductive rea-
soning in causal nets, namely the use of domain knowledge to select
among alternative diagnoses. We describe how preferences among
multiple causes of a given state can be expressed in terms of causal
nets, and how these preferences can be used to select among alter-
native diagnoses. We investigate this new extension by proving a
number of properties, and show how our preference scheme interacts
with conventional ways of choosing among competing diagnoses.
Our extension increases the expressive power of causal nets, enjoys a
number of desirable properties, and compares favourably with exist-
ing proposals for expressing preferential knowledge in causal nets.
1 INTRODUCTION
The standard definition of abduction in causal nets (e.g. [2]) often
yields multiple possible explanations of a given set of observations,
without any further means of distinguishing between these explana-
tions. In this paper, we show how knowledge required for making
such selections can be represented in logic-based causal nets: in a
specified context, one causal explanation is preferred over another.
Such preferences among different causal explanations on the basis
of external conditions are often used in practical diagnostic settings.
They can be used to select one among all abductive explanations on
the basis of additional domain knowledge about plausibility, danger,
urgency, cost etc.
Our particular encoding of such selection knowledge has some de-
sirable properties: the addition of selection knowledge leaves the
standard notion of abductive solution unperturbed; certain types of
selected solutions are guaranteed to exist whenever a normal solution
exists; and standard causal nets are a special case of our extended
causal nets.
Section 2 summarises some of the basic definitions from the literature.
Section 3 presents our extensions of causal nets with selection condi-
tions and gives some examples and properties. Section 4 discusses the
interaction between our selection conditions and conventional, more
syntactic ways of selecting among abductive explanations. Section 5
concludes.
2 BASIC DEFINITIONS
In causal nets, states in the world are represented as predicates, and
the fact that state

necessarily causes state

is represented as




. A weaker notion of causality can be modelled as proposed
in [3]:  possibly causes  (but not necessarily) can be written as

	 


, where
 
is interpreted as the unknown condition

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required for

to cause

. A further refinement is the notion of
context: information about the world that need not itself be causally
explained, but that influences causal transitions. If


causes

in
context 
 
, we write 
   
  
. An example of contextual
information is that in women, pregnancy causes high blood pressure.
Womanhood is not one of the causes of high blood pressure, but is an
enabling condition for the causal link between pregnancy and high
blood pressure. The crucial aspect of such contextual knowledge is
that it can be observed (like symptoms), but that unlike symptoms, it
need not be explained by causal chains. Notice that the representation
of contextually dependent (or: conditional) causal links is the same as
for possible causal links (since           	 
  ), but their treatment in the definitions of diagnostic problem
and solution are different: the truth values of conditions are given,
while the value of unknown symbols must be assumed. Obviously,
conditional and possible causality can be combined, with 
 


	ﬀ 



stating that under conditions 
 
,

possibly
causes

. All this is summarised in the following, more or less
standard definition of causal net:
Definition 2.1 (Causal Net) A causal net ﬁ is a set of propositional
sentences ﬂ of the following form:




necessary causality

ﬃ	 

 (possible causality)

 
 



 (conditional causality)

 !


	
 "

 (conditional possible causality)
Furthermore, we define the following terminology:
# INIT

ﬁ

, the initial nodes, are those


only occurring on the
lefthand side of implications;
# OBS

ﬁ

, the terminal nodes, are those
$
only occurring on the
righthand side of implications;
# UNKNOWN

ﬁ

the unknown symbols, are the
 
;
# COND

ﬁ

, the conditional symbols, are the 
 
.
These causal nets can be used in diagnostic problem solving. In a
diagnostic problem, we are given a causal net, some observations and
a context, and we want to find an abductive explanation that in the
given context (i) implies the observations (ii) does not imply any of
the absent observations, and (iii) is consistent with the causal net.
Definition 2.2 (Diagnostic Problem) A diagnostic problem is a tu-
ple %&ﬁ('*)
',+.-/ , with ﬁ a causal net, )0 COND

ﬁ
 (the true con-
textual conditions) and + - 0 OBS  ﬁ  (the observed symptoms).
ﬂ
We limit ourselves to representing states by propositional letters, but [2]
shows that the extension to the predicate case is unproblematic.
c
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Definition 2.3 (Solution to a Diagnostic Problem) A solution to a
diagnostic problem %&ﬁ ' )
',+ - / is a tuple %

' / with

0 INIT

ﬁ

and  0 UNKNOWN

ﬁ

such that
ﬁ )

	+
- (1)
ﬁ )


+ (2)
Notice that we align ourselves with [3] in demanding that a solution
to a diagnostic problem should imply the observed symptoms and
be consistent with absent symptoms, although other choices in this
matter are possible, as described in [3]
In general, we are interested in the smallest solutions, which explain
the observations through a minimal set of abnormal states:
Definition 2.4 (Diagnosis as Minimal Solution) A solution %  ' /
is a minimal solution (written  -min  %  ' /  ) iff no proper subset
of   is a solution. Such a minimal solution is called a diagnosis.
3 SELECTION CONDITIONS
3.1 Why preferences are useful
The standard definition of minimal abductive diagnosis in causal nets
as given above often yields multiple explanations for a given set of
observations, without any further ways to distinguish between these
alternative explanations. In practical diagnostic settings, experts ex-
ploit knowledge about the preference for different explanations under
different circumstances. Such additional domain knowledge can be
used to make a selection among multiple abductive explanations. We
might want to choose the most probable explanation, or the most
dangerous one (if remedial action must be taken), or the cheapest one
to confirm (if further checks must be carried out), etc.
A typical example of such knowledge is: “A non-working light can
be explained by either a broken bulb or by a flat battery, but if the
temperature is sub-zero, a flat battery is the most likely explanation”.
Thus, contextual knowledge (such as the temperature being sub-zero)
expresses a preference among the various possible causes of a state.
Practical knowledge-engineering tools like MOLE [7] do indeed ex-
ploit such knowledge in the causal nets that they elicit from domain
experts. Such knowledge cannot be encoded in the nets from the pre-
vious section, since the sub-zero temperature does not by itself cause
the observation, nor is it a necessary condition. It is however very
desirable that such knowledge should be represented in causal nets
for diagnosis.
# The preferences among different possible causes for a single state
reduces the number of diagnoses.
# The knowledge can be used to prefer diagnoses with a particu-
lar property, since the selection criteria are based on case specific
contextual knowledge. There preferences might be based on directly
observable circumstances (such as the sub-zero temperature men-
tioned above), but might also be used to enforce desirable properties
of a diagnosis such as urgency or cost.
# The search for diagnoses can be performed faster, since during the
search, non-preferred causes can be removed from the search-space,
and the computation can focus on the preferred causes.
We therefore define a new type of causal net, which enriches the nets
from the previous section with expressions which indicate that the
causal link between


and


is preferred under condition 
 
.

In this paper, we define 

as ﬀﬁﬃﬂ! #"%$'&)(+*
-
 , representing
the absent symptoms. A straightforward generalisation is to take 

as
some subset of this. That would allow a distinction between absent symp-
toms ( 

) and unknown symptoms (namely those symptoms neither in

-
nor in 

).
3.2 Soft selections
Notation: We write
 %,  
for a causal link of any type from
 
to

.
Definition 3.1 (Causal Nets with Selection Conditions)
A causal net with selection conditions is a causal net ﬁ as in
Def. 2.1, with the following changes:
# For every causal link
 , 
in ﬁ , we introduce a preference
predicate 
 
. (If absent, such a predicate is assumed to be false).
# For every causal link
 , 
in ﬁ we define the selection
condition -
 
as -
 /. 

 1032465

4
 
.
The 
 
are intended to be the domain specific predicates which ex-
press when a causal link is preferred over others (such as the sub-zero
temperature in the earlier example). The -   will capture when a
causal link is selected for an explanation: either its preference pred-
icate 
 
is true, or it is false, but all of the competing neighbouring
links (all 
4
,  ) also have a false preference predicate.
The definitions for diagnostic problem and solution remain almost
unchanged for this new type of causal net, so we do not repeat them
here. Definition 2.2 of a diagnostic problem must be trivially adapted
to become %&ﬁ(' )
'87.'*+ - / to take into account the given truth-values
of the additional contextual symbols 
 
. Formula 2 in Definition 2.3
must be trivially changed to include 7 in the consistency demand, in
order to enforce consistency of 7 .
In Def. 3.1 a -
 
indicates that the corresponding link
$
,

is
selected. Obviously, we want to select those solutions to a diagnostic
problem where the selection conditions -
 
have played a maximally
guiding role. We encode this in the following use of the -
 
:
Notation: We write 9
 (defined as 9 ;:=<  , 
>?5 -  A@ )
for the set of unselected links causing


. We write 9 (defined as
9
:ﬃB

9
 ) for the set of all unselected links in ﬁ .
Definition 3.2 (Local Preference) A solution %  ' / is locally pre-
ferred over %
DC
'
C
/ (written %  ' /FE/GIH % JC ' C / ) iff
KMLN
ﬁPOM9

 )


QR +
-
+SUT VUTXW 
ﬁPOM9

 )


C
Q
C
 +
-
+SUT VUT V 
ﬁ  )


QR

 +SUT VUT S 
ﬁ  )

1C
Q
C


+SUT VUT Y 
The rationale of this is as follows: ﬁﬃOM9

represents the causal net
with the causes of


restricted to only the selected links (since 9  , the
unselected causes of

, are removed). The definition now states that
%

' / is preferred over %
DC
'+
C
/ iff % JC ' C / uses an unselected link
through


to imply + - (since the removal of the unselected links
through

prevent %
JC
'
C
/ from implying + - ; (3.2.2)), whereas
%

' / does not use an unselected link through
ﬃ (since it still im-
plies + - , even after removal of all the unpreferred links through
 
;
(3.2.1)). Thus, at location   , %  C ' C / makes essential use of an uns-
elected link, whereas %

' / does not. The third and fourth condition
above ensure that this distinction between %

' / and %
ZC
'+
C
/ occurs
at a node


which does indeed play a role in both solutions (i.e. a
node which occurs somewhere on a path in ﬁ between diagnosis and
observations) [.
We only have reason to prefer an entire solution
6\M]
 over another
solution
6\M]
ﬂ
if
6\A]
 is somewhere locally preferred over
6\M]
ﬂ
, and
nowhere else is
6\M]
ﬂ
locally preferred over
6\M]
 :
[
Strictly speaking, (3.2.4) is redundant since it is already implied by (3.2.2)
plus the fact that ^X_ Ca`+bCdc is a solution.
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Definition 3.3 (Global Preference) A solution 6\M]  is globally pre-
ferred over
6\M]
ﬂ
(written 6\M]  E  H 6\A]
ﬂ
) iff
 6\M]

E/G H
6\M]
ﬂ
 	35  6\M]
ﬂ
E/GIH
6\M]


.
The definition of a selected solution is then as expected:
Definition 3.4 (Selection)
A solution
6\M]
 is selected (written  ]     6\M]   ) iff there is no
other solution
6\M]
ﬂ
with
6\M]
ﬂ
E   H
6\M]

.
	
	
	











[



ﬂ


















ﬂ


ﬂ





[





ﬂ


ﬂ




selected solutions
W    
<

'

ﬂ
@<ﬀ

'


@<
ﬂ
@<
ﬂ
'


@<ﬀ

'

ﬂ
'


@
V  W   <

'

ﬂ
@ <
ﬂ
@<
ﬂ
'


@<ﬀ

'

ﬂ
'


@
S W  W  <

'

ﬂ
@ <ﬀ

'

ﬂ
'


@
Y W W   <

'

ﬂ
@<ﬀ

'


@<
ﬂ
@<
ﬂ
'


@<ﬀ

'

ﬂ
'


@
Figure 1.
Example 3.5 Figure 1 shows an example net with preference pred-
icates. All links are necessary causal links. The table shows the se-
lected solutions for + -
: <	ﬁ
'
	

@
and various truth-values of
preference predicates.
# Case 1 in this table has all preferences false, resulting in exactly the
normal abductive solutions (according to Definition 2.3), of which
<ﬀ

'


@
and
<
ﬂ
@
are the  -min solutions (Definition 2.4).
# Case 2 illustrates the effect of a true preference predicate. Since

ﬂ

is true, -
ﬂ

is true and - 

is false. This forces the use of

ﬂ
to
explain
	
, thereby removing
<ﬀ

'


@
as a solution.
# Case 3 shows a configuration of preference predicates which leads
to a greatly reduced set of selected solutions. For instance, solu-
tion
<
ﬂ
'


@
is no longer selected, since it uses the unselected link

ﬂ

 
while the selected solution
<ﬀ

'

ﬂ
@
uses the preferred al-
ternative



ﬂ
.
# Case 3 is also an illustration of solutions which are locally pre-
ferred but not globally, and are therefore not selected: we have
<ﬀ

'


@
E
GIH
<
ﬂ
@
, but since we also have
<ﬀ
ﬂ
@
E
G H
<ﬀ

'


@
neither solution is globally preferred and thus neither is selected.
# Case 4 shows a configuration of 
 
which does not lead to a re-
duction. At every node


, either all 
 
are true or all 
 
are false.
This makes every -
 
true, and therefore results in the entire set of
solutions being selected, as in case 1.
3.3 Hard selections
In Definitions 3.2–3.4, we have used preference predicates to express
a preference among abductive explanations. Under these definitions,
unselected links can still be used in an explanation, namely when
selected links do not suffice for an explanation. An alternative, and
more strict use of the selection criteria would be to demand that only
those links can be used in an explanation whose selection condition
-
 
is true. We will call this use of the selection criteria hardselection,
(and refer to the selection from Definition 3.4 as soft selection).
Definition 3.6 (Hard Selected)
A solution %

'+ / is hard selected (written hard-selected %  '+ /  )
iff ﬁﬃOA9  )37 

Q +
-
The rationale of this definition is that it demands of a solution that it
is still a solution if we restrict the net to only those links with a true
selection condition.

 [

[

















	 	 

[



ﬂ


Figure 2.
Example 3.7 In the net of Figure 2, if + - : <ﬃ	 @ and with    , 
[

and 
 [
as the only true preference predicates, then both <ﬀ  @ and
<ﬀ
ﬂ
@
are soft-selected solutions, whereasonly <ﬀ  @ is a hard-selected
solution (since <ﬀ
ﬂ
@
uses the unpreferred link 
ﬂ
 
[
).
3.4 Properties
Whereas the truth or falsehood of a condition from ) determines the
presence or absence of a causal link in the net, the truth or falsehood
of a preference predicate from 7 does not affect the presence of the
link, but only how this link will be used. This is captured in the
following property, which follows from the fact that Definition 2.3
remains essentially unchanged

:
Property 3.8 (Selection conditions do not affect solutions)
%

' / is a solution for %&ﬁ(' )
' + - / iff %  ' / is a solution for
%&ﬁ(' )
'87.' + - / for any consistent value of 7 .
A desirable property is that a soft-selected diagnosis always exists if
a diagnosis exists at all:
Property 3.9 (Existence of soft-selected solutions) If %&ﬁ ' )
',+ - /
has a solution then %&ﬁ ' )
' 7.' + - / has a soft-selected solution for
any 7 .
This property fails for hard-selected solutions. This can be seen in
the net from figure 1. If we take again
	
-
: <	ﬁ
'
	

@
, but now we
take 
[

as the only true preference predicate, then no solution exists,
since of the three explanations of
	ﬁ (namely 
ﬂ
,


and

[
), the first
two fail the hard selected criterion of definition 3.6, and the last one
is disabled because of its inconsistency with the unobserved
	


.
The following property shows that the standard nets from Defini-
tion 2.1 are a special case of our extended nets: a net without prefer-
ence conditions behaves as a net with such conditions if all the 
 
are either true or false:
Property 3.10 (Reduction to net without selection conditions)
When either all 
  .
 or all 
  .! 
then every solution is
hard-selected (and by property 3.11 also soft-selected).
Hard selected solutions are a special case of soft selected solutions:
Property 3.11 (Inclusion of hard selections in soft selections)
If hard-selected 6\M]  then soft-selected  6\A] 

Because of lack of space, we omit proofs
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Finally, both hard and soft selection turn out to be monotonic in the
size of solutions:
Property 3.12 (Monotonicity of selected solutions) If 6\M]  , 6\A]
ﬂ
are both solutions to a diagnostic problem, with
6\A]

0
6\A]
ﬂ
then:
# If soft-selected  6\M]   then soft-selected  6\M]
ﬂ

.
# If hard-selected 6\M]   then hard-selected 6\M]
ﬂ

.
This means that hard and soft selection are by themselves not suffi-
cient to produce minimal solutions, since every solution containing
a selected solution is again selected. We will need to combine our
selection criteria with other minimality criteria to achieve satisfactory
minimal solutions. This is the subject of the next section.
4 COMBINATION WITH EXISTING
MINIMALITY CRITERIA
Property 3.12 shows that it will be necessary to combine our selection
criteria with minimality criteria such as  -min (from Definition 2.4),
since selected solutions by themselves are not sufficiently restricted:
any solution containing a selected solution is again selected. In this
section we investigate how the syntactically oriented minimality cri-
teria such as  -min interact with our selection criteria.
One of the simplest ways to combine minimality criteria is lexico-
graphically: apply one criterion to solutions minimal under the other.
We could for instance apply selection to all  -min solutions. For this
we write soft-  -min, defined by:
Definition 4.1 (subset-minimality then soft-selection)
For any solution

, soft-  -min    iff
 -min



	 5DK 
C
N
 -min


C 
	 
C
E 
H

.
Thus, a solution is soft-  -min iff it is soft-selected among the  -min
solutions. This combination has the pleasant property that the selec-
tion criteria further reduce the number of  -min solutions, and in fact
always produce a subset of these:
Property 4.2 (Reduction of diagnoses by selection)
If soft-  -min  6\M]  then  -min  6\A]  .
Although trivial, we state this property here, since it shows that the
selection conditions (if used in this way) do indeed reduce the number
of solutions. This property does not hold when soft selection and
 -min are combined in the opposite order. If we define  -soft-min
as
Definition 4.3 (Soft-selection then subset-minimality)
For any solution

,  -soft-min    iff
soft-selected    	 5DK  C N soft-selected   C  	  C   .
(i.e.  -soft-min    iff  is  -min among the soft-selected solutions),
then the following example illustrates that property 4.2 does not
always hold for this combination of minimalities:
  


ﬂ



[
 











 




Figure 3.
Example 4.4 In Figure 3, when + -
: < 

'

[
@
, and 
 

and  

are true, then using  -soft-min   gives <   ' 
ﬂ
@
and
<

'

ﬂ
@
as
diagnoses, whereas ignoring the 
 
, we would only have
<ﬀ
ﬂ
@
as a
 -minimal diagnosis.
A third combination the orderings is to apply them simultaneously:
Definition 4.5 (Soft-selection and subset-minimality) For any so-
lution

, soft-&-  -min    iff soft-selected    	  -min   
This is a rather strong minimality criterion, and it does not even
guarantee the existence of minimal solutions when solutions exist, a
property which does hold for the other two combinations:
Property 4.6 (Existence of minimal solutions)
# A soft-  -min and a  -soft-min solution exist iff a solution exists.
# A soft-&-  -min solution is not guaranteed to exist when a solution
exists
Example 4.4 shows the possible non-existence of soft-&-  -min solu-
tions:
<	 
'

ﬂ
@
,
<

'

ﬂ
@
and
<	 
'


'

ﬂ
@
are soft-selected solutions,
while
<ﬀ
ﬂ
@
is the only  -min solution, so no solution exists which
satisfies both criteria.
Since property 3.12 (monotonicity) also holds for hard-selected so-
lutions, we must also combine hard-selected with  -min to obtain
useful minimal hard selected solutions. We can define  -hard-min
and hard-&-  -min analogously to definitions 4.3 and 4.5. The fol-
lowing gives a full picture of the relationship between these criteria.
Property 4.7 (Increasing chains of selection criteria)
hard-&-  -min

soft-&-  -min  soft-  -min   -min

 

 -hard-min  -soft-min  soft-selected

 
hard-selected
This shows that we can combine the various selection mechanisms
into ever more selective configurations.The underlined combinations
are guaranteed to yield a minimal solution if any solution to the
diagnostic problem exists at all. The other combinations may return
no solution, even though definition 2.3 would allow one.
Which of these minimality criteria should be chosen depends on ap-
plication specific criteria. One might want to use the domain specific
preference criteria before general measures like  -min. This would
lead us to choose  -soft-min over soft-  -min. Secondly, stronger
minimality criteria would seem preferable, leading us to criteria to-
ward the left of the picture. This is counteracted by the desire not to
loose real solutions through minimality criteria. This would restrict
us to the underlined combinations. Another possibility is first to use
stronger combinations, and to relax these for those problems where
no solution is returned.
It seems that none of these or other combinations of minimality cri-
teria and preferences is ideal for all situations. This is exactly as pre-
dicted in [5], where Doyle proves that no combination of preferences
exists which is optimal (or even acceptable) under all circumstances.
5 DISCUSSION
Computational issues: Definition 3.6 shows that finding hard-
selected solutions corresponds to finding normal solutions in a re-
duced network (replacing ﬁ by ﬁﬃOM9 ). Thus, finding hard-selected
solutions will in general be easier and certainly not harder than
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finding normal solutions. Similarly, we can reduce computing soft-
selected solutions in ﬁ to computing hard-selected solutions in
ﬁ
C
:
ﬁﬃO
<  > KI\ 
+

N
ﬁ  ) 


\U@
. However, because
of the complexity of reducing ﬁ to ﬁ
C
this does not immediately
give an efficient algorithm for computing soft-selected solutions.
Comparison with other work: The MOLE system [7] is a practi-
cal diagnostic system that uses preferences. However, no declarative
account of the preferences is given, and this deficiency was in fact one
of the motivations that lead us to this work. It turns out that MOLE’s
preferences correspond exactly to the hard preferences from Defini-
tion 3.6.
The plausabilities in [1] resemble our preferential knowledge, but are
only defined for initial nodes, while our preferences can be defined
on arbitrary links, anywhere in the net. The same remark holds for
the mode preferences from [6].
Although the probabilities from [11] may at first sight resemble pref-
erential knowledge, they are in fact quite different. The probabilities
encode the strength of the causal link (which may then be used for
preference purposes), whereas our preferences are independent of the
strength of the causal link, and can be used to encode preferences on
the basis of not only plausibility, but also danger, cost, urgency etc.
The same remark holds for [12].
Although not in a diagnostic context, [13] has proposed a scheme for
weighted abduction where literals in a theory (in our case: nodes in
a causal net) are equipped with numerical weights, and minimisation
of weights is used to select among competing explanations. However,
assignment of the numerical weights is problematic, and no semantics
exists for the interpretation of these weights.
Much work that is close in motivation to our own has been done
in the context of consistency-based diagnosis. [8] discusses the use
of prioritised defaults to express preferences among diagnoses. The
resulting preference mechanism is not very flexible, and comes at
the price of a rather non-standard formalism. [6] describes a way
of expressing preferences among fault modes which is at the same
time more flexible then Junker’s and uses a simpler formalism (normal
default logic). Our work differs from these approaches in a number of
ways: it is set in an abductive rather than a consistency-basedcontext;
we use only a standard first order formalism; and both [8] and [6]
express only preferences among fault-modes (roughly corresponding
to our set INIT

ﬁ
 ), whereas we exploit the structure of the entire
theory to express preferences.
Our preferences are a way to select among competing solutions.
Other work (e.g. [10]) tries to obtain new discriminating observa-
tions to select among competing solutions. Our preferences are a
selection method that should be applied when it is no longer possible
or desirable to obtain further discriminating observations.
Future work: An obvious extension that is required to make the
results from this paper more useful is to allow ﬁ to be a Horn Clause
theory. The results from [2] lead us to believe that this will not present
any significant difficulty.
Extending our results beyond Horn Clause theories might be more
problematic. Because we attach the preference predicates to causal
links, we make very specific assumptions about the syntactic form of
ﬁ . Although these assumptions are widely made in the literature on
abductive diagnosis [2, 12], other formalisations of abduction deal
with ﬁ as an arbitrary theory (e.g. [9], or the abductive case of [4]).
It is unclear how our approach could be used in theories that do not
impose a particular syntactic form for individual causal links.
A second extension involves an enlarged vocabulary for expressing
preferential knowledge. At first sight, it would seem useful to allow
also negative preferences (“do not use this link under a certain condi-
tion”), and preferential knowledge on states as well as on links (this
vocabulary is used in MOLE [7]). Preliminary investigations suggest
that these extensions can all be expressed in terms of the formalism
of this paper.
Achievements: We have extended logic-based causal nets by an-
notating causal links with selection criteria. These selection criteria
provide a way to select abductive explanations on the basis of addi-
tional domain knowledge (the preference predicates    ). This differs
from standard techniques in the literature, which are typically very
syntactic in nature. They are based on the topology of the net, whereas
our selection criteria are based on domain specific knowledge.
The preference conditions can be used in two ways to select among
competing abductive solutions: hard and soft selection. We have
shown how these nets, and the solutions they produce, are related
to the standard causal nets: normal nets are a special case of nets with
preference conditions; soft selected solutions are guaranteed to exist
when normal solutions exist; hard selected solutions are a special case
of soft solutions and are not always guaranteed to exist. Both types of
selection suffer from a monotonicity property which requires the com-
bination of the selection scheme with other minimality criteria. We
showed how our selection schemes can be combined with such mini-
mality criteria in a large variety of ever more selective configurations.
Our representation of preferential knowledge is completely orthog-
onal to other extensions of causal nets such as conditional causality
and possible causality, coherent hypothesis sets, abstraction layers in
causal nets etc, enabling an unproblematic combination between our
preference conditions and these numerous other extensions.
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